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The  author  studies  the  impact  of  political  economy  variables  on  the  spatial  distribution  of 
industry. The political game between a single lobby and a partial opportunistic incumbent may 
alter the economic landscape of a small economy. The trade policy endogenously determined 
becomes the channel to understand how the players’ behaviour impacts on the long run spatial 
distribution of industry. When the rest of the world is a free trader and the spending share of an 
economy is relatively small, the marginal change in the trade policy has a relevant impact on the 
industry share. Amazingly, if a small economy is characterised by a government that is not very 
much concerned about general welfare and there is a lobby of few capital owners that play 
actively, the possible outcome will be a relocation of industry that favours such an economy. 
Capital owners might make capital flow to look for protection. Political variables may act as a 
dispersion force. 
Keywords: Agglomeration; Endogenous trade policy formation; Factor mobility; Monopolistic 
competition; Trade. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The location of economic activity has regained the centre of the political and economic debates 
since many processes of trade integration and trade liberalisation have waxed along the world. 
Policy makers and economists have deeply discussed the effects that such processes would have 
on the economic landscape trying to infer whether they would foster more divergences among 
nations or not. Controversial opinions have risen.    
Theoretical research has advanced in this field seeking to offer an explanation of the mechanisms 
that  may  fuel  spatial  concentration  in  the  economic  activity.  Particularly  the  new  economic 
geography  theory,  through  its  different  theoretical  models,  analyses  the  agglomeration  and 
dispersion forces that govern the economic geography space. These settings introduce different 
sorts of motions to explain the concentration and dispersion processes. For instance, the Core-
Periphery (Krugman, 1991) and Footloose Entrepreneur (Ottaviano, 1996 and Forslid, 1999) 
backgrounds use labour migration to drive agglomeration. The Footloose Capital model (Martin 
and Rogers, 1995) considers capital factor mobility to generate it. Dynamic models introduce 
capital  accumulation  and  the  growth  rate  of  knowledge  capital  to  feed  spatial  concentration 
(Baldwin, 1999 and Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano, 2001). 
In all these models the level of trade freeness that prevails in one economy plays an important 
role in defining the strength of agglomeration and dispersion processes. Both forces tend to be 
less effective if trade is almost completely free. However, at high level of trade costs, dispersion 
forces are stronger than agglomeration forces while at low level of trade costs, dispersion forces 
weaken faster than agglomeration forces.  
From this theoretical perspective, the geographic distribution of the economic activity tends to be 
lumpy as nations become freer in terms of trade costs. Trade cost is a relevant variable in the 
definition of the economic landscape picture. An interesting and relevant question is, therefore, 
what determines it? The new economic geography theory models trade costs as an exogenous 
variable. The trade cost concept consists of a wide range of barriers such as transport costs and 
all  sorts  of  trade  policies  in  general.  Though  several  of  them  can  be  viewed  as  exogenous 
parameters, others have an intrinsic endogenous nature. In fact, quite often countries design their 
trade policies in a way that they are the outcome of a political interaction among interest groups 
and governments. In this context, incumbents take policy decisions considering not only the 
well-being of the society but also their own political interests. 
The aim of this paper is to consider those costs that are related to the political behaviour as an 
endogenous variable in a new economic geography setting. The idea is to build a model that may  
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explain the economic geography disparities among regions considering not only the economic 
variables but also the political ones. In order to pursue such objective, two backgrounds are 
interrelated. On the one hand, the Footloose Capital model (FC) is chosen to model the economic 
structure of a small economy. On the other hand, the political ingredient of the model is shaped 
taken as backbone the model of Grossman and Helpman developed in protection for sale (1994). 
Both  settings  share  some  interesting  features  that  make  the  author  choose  them.  They  are 
parsimonious models; while the FC model qualifies because it is the most tractable model among 
other  economic  geography  settings,  the  G-H  approach  has  been  chosen  because  it  provides 
microfundations to the player’s actions that are less formally specified in other political economy 
models2.  
The note is structured as follows. Section II presents the formal background where the economic 
and the political behaviours are specified. Section III shows the results of the short run when 
decisions of firms are focussed on lobbying activities due to the fact that capital is not mobile in 
this period. Section IV deal with the long run equilibrium. Section V presents some appealing 
insights of an exercise. Finally, section VI gives the concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. The Framework 
 
The economic structure takes the form of the FC model in which two regions, two sectors and 
two productive factors are considered. One region is small and represents the home country; the 
other is a large economy which can be viewed as the rest of the world. They have similar tastes 
and technologies. The two sectors are the industrial (the modern sector) and the agricultural (the 
traditional  sector).  The  industrial  sector,  which  produces  a  number  of  varieties,  features 
increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. The agricultural 
sector produces a homogeneous good under constant return to scale and perfect competition. 
This good is traded without frictions. The two factors are physical capital and labour. While the 
manufacture activity uses both factors, the agriculture sector produces the homogeneous good 
only employing labour. In the short run the capital factor cannot migrate. However, in the long 
run it moves freely between regions searching for the highest nominal reward3. Labour is the 
immobile factor.  
                                            
2 Rodrik (1995) reviewed the political economy literature. In this paper the author has stressed this advantage.   
3  Although  physical  capital  is  perfectly  mobile  in  the  long  run,  the  FC  model  assumes  that  capital  owners  are 
completely  immobile  across  regions.  Thus,  owners  spend  their  incomes  in  the  region  where  they  live.  This  
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The  regions  are  populated  by  individuals  with  identical  preferences  though  different 





















µ c n nc c U A  (1) 
where  A c  is the consumption of the agricultural good, which is chosen to be the numeraire good.  
c and
* c  are, respectively, the domestic and foreign differentiated industrial goods consumed by 
a  representative  resident  of  the  small  economy  and  n   and 
* n   are  the  numbers  of  varieties 
produced in the local and foreign economies5. Thus, the total number of varieties available in 
both  regions  is 
* n n N + = .  µ   represents  the  expenditure  on  all  varieties  and  ! ,  which  is 
assumed to be greater than 1, stands for the own and cross constant price elasticity.  
The total expenditure that a typical individual devotes to both sorts of goods is given by the 
amountE . With quasilinear preferences, the demand functions of local and foreign goods,c  
and







1 * 1 p n np
p











c  (2) 
where  p  denotes the price of the local differentiated good,  p  stands for the price of the foreign 
differentiated good and  ( ) ! ! ! " " " + = # 1
1
1 * 1 p n np  is the average price that prevails in the home 
economy.  The demand function of the numeraire good equals to: 
µ ! = E c A  (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) represent the optimal choices of an individual in terms of consumption. 
The corresponding indirect utility function takes the form: 
( ) ( ) [ ] µ µ µ ! " + = "
!1 , Ln E E V    (4) 
where  ( ) ( ) [ ] µ µ µ ! " = "
!1 Ln s   is  the  consumer  surplus  that  each  individual  derives  from  the 
consumption of varieties.  
The two productive sectors use different technologies. The technology of the agricultural sector 
is modelled as simply as possible. This sector uses only labour to produce the traditional good 
under constant returns to scale. It requires one unit of labour to make one unit of the numeraire 
                                                                                                                                             
assumption prevents the model from presenting the circular causality characteristic. Though this absence makes the 
FC model totally tractable, it brings the disadvantage of losing the self-reinforcing mechanism that agglomeration 
forces present in other economic geography models.  
4 The rest of the world has an identical economic structure. All variables of the large economy are symbolized by an 
asterisk.  
5 One of the results in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model is that there is one firm per variety and one 
variety per firm.   
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good,  1 = A a . The aggregate supply of labour is sufficient to ensure a positive supply of this 
good. As a result of these assumptions, the wage rate of labour, l w , equals 1. Labour factor is 
considered to be immobile across regions but mobile across sectors. 
The industrial sector exhibits increasing return to scale. A typical firm faces a cost function 
which is not homothetic6. The fixed cost includes only the reward of capital while the variable 
cost involves the retribution of the labour factor:  
L mXw a K TC + = !    (5) 
where!  is the reward of capital,  m a  is the input-output requirement of labour and  x x X + =  is 
the total supply of a typical firm. To keep the cost structure in a simple fashion, it is assumed that 
each firm requires only one unit of physical capital, that is 1 = K .  
Each firm can sell its production in the local market or abroad. When domestic varieties are sold 
in the large region, local firms face an iceberg trade cost, * ! . Similarly, when a foreign firm 
wants to sell its production in the small economy, it faces a trade cost equal to! , which in this 













#   (6) 
where  p  is the price of the domestic variety that prevails in the small economy and 
* p  is the 




"  is the mark up that the 
local firm charges above the marginal cost,  m a .  As one can see, p p
* * ! = . Similar results hold 
for a foreign firm. The maximization problem of a foreign firm gives the prices for the foreign 















#  (7) 
where 
* p  is the price of the foreign variety that prevails in the foreign economy and  p  is the 
price of the foreign variety that prevails in the small economy. In this case,
* p p ! = . Moreover, 
since  both  economies  are  assumed  to  have  the  same  technology  in  both  sectors,
*
m m a a = , 
domestic and foreign varieties have the same price in domestic and foreign markets respectively, 
that is 
* p p = . However, an asymmetry in prices between both regions arises since trade costs 
are generally different, 
* p p ! .  
                                            
6 The factor intensity of the fixed cost differs from the factor intensity of the variable cost.   
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In the small economy, the government has as unique tool an import tariff to influence the internal 
prices of varieties because the homogeneous good is traded without frictions7.  The government 
introduces a wedge between the internal and foreign price if it decides to set such a tariff. The 
tax revenue that the incumbent derives from this policy, in per capita terms, is given by: 
( )
* * 1 c p n r ! = "  (8) 
The government redistributes the tax income equally among individuals. Individuals also derive 
income from alternative sources. Each resident derives income as owner of that their incomes are 
influenced by the external competition one unit of labour and also possibly as owner of capital 
factor. It is assumed that individuals may have at most one unit of capital, which is used to 
produce  a  particular  variety.  Those  individuals  that  have  some  unit  of  physical  capital  will 
perceive n of foreign differentiated goods. For this reason, they will be interested to prevent such 
competition via a tariff applied to all foreign varieties. A higher tariff increases the average price 
of  the  small  economy  since    ( ) ! ! ! " " " + = # 1
1
1 * 1 p n np   and 
* p p ! =   .  As  it  can  be  seen  from 
equation (2), a higher average price tends to increase the demand of the local differentiated good, 
which of course favours local firms.  
In the short run, capital cannot flow from one region to the other in order to look for higher 
nominal rewards. Hence, owners of the specific capital will try to increase their income by an 
alternative way, avoiding the external competition. Since they have a common interest in doing 
that, they may choose to join forces for political activity. It is assumed that capital owners can 
overcome the free-rider problem that arises in collective actions and organise themselves into an 
interest group.  
The lobby that represents the interest of capital owners makes political contributions contingent 
on the tariff imposed by the government.  ( ) ! g C  denotes the contribution schedule offered by the 
lobby.  The  lobby  chooses  the  optimal  level  of  the  contribution  maximizing  its  total  net 
welfare g g g C W V ! = . The gross welfare is given by: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ! ! " ! # $ + + $ + = %
=





,  (9) 
where  g l  is the total labour supply of capital owners,  i !  is the profit of a firm that produces a 
particular variety i,  g !  is the fraction of the voting population that owns the capital input and 
belongs to the lobby,  ( ) ) (! ! Ir R =  is the total tax revenue,  ( ) ( ) ) (P Is S = ! "  stands for the aggregate 
consumer surplus, and I  represents the total population of the small economy.  
                                            
7 For simplicity, it is assumed that trade cost are only the sort of ad-valorem tariff barriers.   
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As  in  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994),  the  government  is  interested  in  both  the  level  of 
contribution and in the well-being of all individuals. The incumbent cares about the total amount 
of contributions because they are a potential source of economic funds to finance campaign 
spending. Contributions also may provide to politicians other direct benefits rather than those 
devoted to improve their chance of being re-elected8. The well being of the society also is of 
concern to the government due to the fact that individuals, as voters, are more likely to re-elect a 
government  that  has  taken  actions  to  improve  their  standard  of  living.    Hence,  the  linear 
objective function that reveals the government’s preferences just equals to: 
( ) ( ) ! " + = , p aW C G g  (10) 
where  a  is the weight that government attaches to the society’s welfare relative to the amount 
of campaign contributions and W  is the aggregate welfare given by: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ! ! ! " # + + # + = $
=





,  (11) 
l  is the total income of labour factor since  1 = l w . Aggregate welfare also comprises the total 
income of capital owners, the total tax revenue and the aggregate consumer surplus. 
Political activity governs the scene of the short run. The model has the structure of the principal-
agent problem. This situation arises when a principal attempts to persuade an agent to take an 
action that may be costly for the agent to perform. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) the 
political ingredient considers two kinds of actors. First, a single interests group, which is the 
principal, serves to coordinate campaign contributions and to communicate the political offers to 
the incumbent. The lobby chooses its contributions maximizing the net welfare of its members. 
Contributions  are  linked  to  the  trade  policy  implemented  by  the  incumbent.    Second,  an 
incumbent government, which acts as the agent, maximises its own objective function given by 
equation (10).  
The  sequence  of  the  model  is  as  follows.  The  short  run  is  characterised  by  a  two-stage 
noncooperative game in which the lobby chooses its political contribution in the first stage and 
the government sets the trade policy in the second. The short run equilibrium gives the optimal 
levels of contribution and trade policy, which is reflected by a parameter that measures the level 
of freeness. In the long run, firms can move from one region to the other looking for the highest 
nominal reward. The long run equilibrium gives the optimal number of firms in each region 
which depends on the optimal level of freeness given by the short run equilibrium.  
                                            
8 Mitra, Thomakos and Uluba￿ o￿ lu (2002) emphasise that in dictatorships the “other sort of benefits” are the main 
reason why dictators are also interested in contribution funds.   
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3. The Short Run equilibrium 
 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) assume that the interaction between lobbies and the government 
takes the form of a menu auction in the sense of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). In proposition 
1 of protection for sale authors characterise the equilibrium of the trade policy game where the 
economic structure features perfect competition among sectors, the technology is governed by 
constant returns to scale and trade policies are of a wider range9.  This paper follows the G-H 
approach assuming the same kind of interaction between the government and a single lobby. In 
this  background,  if  the  contribution  function  is  differentiable  and  the  equilibrium  price 
maximises both the welfare of the particular lobby and the government’s objective function, the 
lobby may choose a contribution that is locally truthful. Such a contribution schedule has the 
interesting property that a marginal change in the contribution mirrors the marginal change in 
lobby’s welfare when both changes are caused by a marginal change in the tariff, that is: 













In  equilibrium,  truthful  contributions  induce  the  government  to  behave  as  if  it  were 
maximising g W aW + 10. In this case, the objective function of the government is characterized by 
a social-welfare function that weights the members of society differently. Lobby’s members 
receive a weight of ( ) a + 1 and individuals that are not organized receive a smaller weight ofa 11. 
The first order condition of this problem is:  















p dWg  (13) 
Equation (13) characterises the equilibrium domestic tariff, and consequently the equilibrium of 
domestic prices, of all varieties supported by the differentiable contribution function.  
To look for the derivatives of the lobby’s welfare and the aggregate welfare with respect to the 
tariff, first a final expression for profits of a typical firm has to be calculated: 
( ) ( ) [ ] x x a I c p pc m + + ! + = " #
*  (14) 
                                            
9 The authors consider the possibility of negative protection. In their model, the government can introduce 
not only import tariffs but also export taxes and import and export subsidies in the n sectors.   
10  One can decompose total welfare to obtain ( ) g g i i W a W a 1 + + ! " .  
11 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have pointed out that the same trade policy outcome may arise when, 
instead of assuming a menu-auction problem, it is assumed a Nash bargaining game. In fact, in a 
bargaining solution trade policies are chosen to maximise the joint surplus of players;  ( ) g W W ! ! " + 1
.  
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Replacing  the  demand  functions  given  by  equations  (2)  and  the  marginal  cost  expression, 
!
! 1 "
= p am ,  in  equation  (14)  and  considering  the  fact  that  the  market  clears 
when( ) x x I c c + = +























$ 1 * *






I  (15) 
where 
* µ  represents the expenditure on all differentiated goods in the large economy. Equation 












1  where 
* *I I
w µ µ + = ! is the total world expenditure in varieties, and in terms of the 
spatial distribution of industry, 
N
n









































1  (16) 
The marginal changes in aggregate welfare and in lobby’s welfare due to a marginal change in 
the tariff are given by the sum of the marginal changes in profits, total tax revenue and aggregate 
consumer  surplus.  As  expected,  the  marginal  policy  change  affects  profits  positively.  Such 
change has two different impacts in the tax revenue. On the one hand, a positive direct effect 
which reflects the fact that when the tariff changes, the income revenue changes in the same 
direction for a certain level of imports.  On the other hand, an indirect negative effect, which 
shows the change in import quantities as the tariff is modified. Finally, the effect of the marginal 
change in the tariff on the aggregate consumer surplus is, of course, negative. 
Replacing  the  impacts  of  the  tariff  change  on  profits,  on  the  total  tax  income  and  on  the 
aggregate consumer surplus into equation (13), the following expression arises in the short run: 





n n n s s
a
a









$ = + $ + $ $
$ $ $ 1 1
1 1
1 1  (17) 
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1 1  (18) 
                                            
12 The assumption of 1 unit of capital per firm implies that
w K N = , where 
w K  is the total stock of physical capital 
in the world .   
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1  represents a measure of freeness that takes values among zero and one. As  !  
increases, !  tends to zero. By contrary, when differentiated goods are almost traded freely13, !  is 
near to one. Equation (18) cannot be solved in general for the degree of freeness,! , since such 
level in the left hand side has different powers in each term. The left hand side (LHS) of equation 
(18) can take positive, null or negative values. It takes positive values for admissible values of 
1 > !   and 1 0 < < n s .  The  higher  the  value  of! ,  the  higher  the  probability  that  the  LHS 
expression is positive for a particular n s . For small values of  n s  the LHS expression can be still 
positive, however as  n s  tend to zero, it tends to be negative. A necessary condition for the LHS 












( ) ) () n n s s (C1).  If the  left  hand  side 
(LHS) is positive, as  !  increases, the LHS increases. A sufficient condition for this positive 
relation is that 
!
!
" ! 1 1
1
#
> #  (C2) 14. Though one cannot obtain from (18) a final expression to 
measure the level of protection, it might be interesting to consider the LHS as a proxy of the 
inverse of such measure and analyse how it is influenced by the political and economic variables.  
Some constructive predictions arise from this approximation.  
Like one of the relevant outcomes of the Grossman and Helpman’s approach, equation (18) 
confirms that when the incumbent has a remarkable concern for the well-being of the society, it 
will avoid creating an important excess burden via the introduction of a high tariff. Hence, for a 
high value ofa , the LHS of equation (18) will also be high.  
As  the  share  of  voters  who  are  members  of  the  interest  group  increases,  the  level  of  trade 
freeness also increases. Though this result is also one of those that Grossman and Helpman 
obtain, the explanation here is somewhat different. In a setting in which many lobbies interact, 
the fact that lobbies want to increase its domestic price but lower the prices of the other goods in 
order  to  avoid  the  excess  burden  as  consumers,  generates  a  competitive  mechanism  that 
neutralise the lobby’s actions one another. Here, with only one interest group as principal, the 
competition effect is absent. However, the members of the lobby, as consumers, also want to 
avoid  the  high  social  cost  of  a  protective  tariff.  The  deadweight  loss  that  the  lobby  faces 
                                            
13 When trade is completely free,  1 = ! . However in this setting with monopolistic competition, when the 
incumbent maximizes the general welfare, the outcome is a second best optimal tariff. Therefore, !  
would tend to be less than one. 
14 This condition does not hold for values of !  near to zero and values of!  near to one.   
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increases as the share of population who belongs to the lobby also increases15. However, the 
extra profits that the group as a whole obtain because of the implementation of the tariff do not 
change with changes in g ! . The negative effect of the distorted tariff that impacts in the welfare’s 
lobby would turn out to be relatively more important than the positive effect of the extra benefit 
for high values of g ! . The incentive to lobby for a tariff would diminish as the share of the 
individual that belongs to the interest group increases. Hence, the optimal trade policy for the 
government might be one which is near to the second best optimal tariff that such government 
would  choose  when  it  maximizes  the  general  welfare.  When 1 = g ! ,  the  LHS  equals 
to ( )
!
! ! 1 " + n n s s ,  which  is  positive  since  by  assumption  1 > ! .  If 0 ! g " ,  the  fraction  of 







holds. In this case, a high level of free trade is the probable outcome when the demand elasticity 
is relatively high16 and the government is well concerned about the general welfare. 
As formula (18) describes, the mark-up that firms set over the marginal cost also influences the 
LHS proxy. As the inverse of the mark up,
!
! 1 "  increases, the proxy expression of the level of 
freeness diminishes. That is, if the mark-up that firms can charge is low, the level of protection 
will be high. Since firms cannot improve their benefits via a high mark-up, they will try to 
increase them by increasing the quantities of the goods that they can sell in the local market. 
Therefore, they will try to avoid the external competition of foreign firms in order to capture a 
higher share of the local market. It seems to be that at a lower mark up, the lobby is more 
worried to persuade the government to set a high tariff. The more elastic the demand of varieties, 
the less the mark up that firms charge; hence the more the incentive of the lobby to increase its 
profits via the political alternative measure. 
However, though lobbies would persuade the government to introduce a tariff when the elasticity 








> ,  (C4),  holds.  The 
political cost that government may bear increases with the excess burden that individuals have to 
face when the incumbent set a tariff. The excess burden associated with the protectionist measure 
                                            
15 The negative impact that the tariff has in the consumer surplus is multiplied by the total number of people that 
belongs to the lobby.  
16 That is when the deadweight loss is important.  
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is higher at higher demand elasticity17. When  0 > a , the condition (4)  will hold for high values 
of  a  and  ! . Moreover, though  0 = a , the government would follow the Ramsey rule. Similar 
reasoning  explained  in  the  previous  paragraph  applies.  If  the  proportion  of  the  society  that 
belongs to the lobby is high,  g !  , the lobby’s welfare will be more affected by the negative effect 
that the tariff imposes to its members as consumers than the positive effect that members can 
derive through it as owners of capital. Therefore, it is more likely that the government sets a 
wedge between the domestic and foreign prices when the demand elasticity is low, since the 
deadweight that the incumbent introduces in this case is lower.18  
The  spatial  distribution  of  firms  also  seems  to  influence  the  structure  of  protection  in  one 
economy19. The relationship between the industry share and the inverse of the level of protection 
is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, one might expect that concentration of firms in one 
region would reflect the political power of the industrial sector since the gains that producers 
would obtain from an increase in protection would be magnified by the number of firms.  In this 
case, the lobby would have much to lose from a free trade policy and therefore would bid more 
actively for protection. But, on the other hand, the presence of a high number of firms in such 
economy involves a tight level of competition among firms that tends to lower the potential gains 
that  capital  owners  would  derive  from  the  protectionist  policy.  In  fact,  when  the  local 
competition  is  important,  foreign  competition  and  the  lobbying  activity  to  avoid  it  become 
irrelevant. The relationship between the given industrial share and the level of freeness will be 
positive if the following inequality holds: 
( )













If the sing of condition (5) is inverted, the relation is negative. Finally, a particular distribution of 
industry might not influence the level of freeness when this level is too small, that is when the 























                                            
17 The excess burden is the sum of the gain of producers, the gain in government revenue and the loss of consumer 
surplus.     
18 The effect of the elasticity of substitution is not easy to visualise since such variable is also present in the LHS of 
equation (18).  
19 Some caution have to be taken when one analyses the impact of   n s  on the level of freeness due to the fact that 
this  variable  is  also  present  in  the  LHS  of  equation  (18).  However,  interesting  plausible  insights  rises  from  the 
following analysis.   




! ! = " # $   also  a  measures  the  degree  of  trade  freeness.    In  this  case,  the  economic 
variables that affect the level of protection are the demand elasticity and the level of the mark up, 
which depends on the elasticity. The protectionist government follows the Ramsey rule as long 
as 2 > ! . Political variables impact in the level of protection in a similar manner as they do in the 
general case.   
 
Political Contributions 
The characterisation of the equilibrium (equation 13) involves the fact that the interest group 
may offer contributions that are locally truthful20. When the lobby plays truthful contributions, it 
will choose the maximum level of its net welfare in such a way that will induce the government 
to select the lobby’s most preferred trade policy. Since the lobby aims to increase its net welfare 
( g B )as high as possible, it will do it by diminishing the level of contribution until making the 
government  be  indifferent  between  the  trade  policies  that  it  can  choose.  In  this  case,  the 
incumbent has two alternative possibilities; it can select the lobby’s most preferred policy,
° ! , or 
the  one  that  maximises  the  general  welfare.  As  mentioned  above,  when  the  government 
maximises  the  general  welfare,  it  will  choose  a  second  best  small  tariff,  as  there  exists  a 
distortion in the economy due to the monopolistic pricing rule. This tariff,
W ! , will be lower than 
that  of  the  lobby’s  most  preferred.  The  equilibrium  campaign  contribution  that  satisfies  the 
incumbent’s indifferent situation is equal to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
° ° ° ° ! = " " " p aW p aW B p C
W
g g , .  
As Grossman and Helpman (1994) have pointed out, when there is only  a single organized 
interest group, it contributes to the government an amount that is proportional to the excess 
burden that the equilibrium trade policy imposes on  society. The proportionality component is 
given by the relative weight that the incumbent sets on the general welfare. The excess burden is 
given by the sum of the gain in the producer surplus when the government chooses the lobby’s 
most preferred equilibrium tariff, the tax revenue that the government derives from such policy 
and the loss of consumer surplus because of the election of the protectionist policy. In this case, 
the government payoff is equal to ( ) ( )
W p aW G ! = , just the same to the one that the incumbent 
would derive if it were implemented a second best trade policy.  
 
                                            
20 The consideration of truthful contributions restricts the set of Nash equilibria that emerge when contribution are 
assumed to be differentiable to the set of truthful Nash equilibria supported by truthful bids functions. Bernheim and 
Whinston (1986) have shown that a player can substitute a truthful strategy for a non-truthful one without facing any 
additional cost. Since these strategies are also coalition proof, they have argued that truthful Nash equilibria may be 
focal among the set of Nash equilibria.    
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4. The Long Run Equilibrium 
 
The key feature of the long run is the mobility of the capital factor. Unlike the short run, capital 
owners can move their endowment from one region to the other looking for the highest nominal 
rewards. In this context, the long run equilibrium is only achieved when there is no incentive for 
the capital to migrate. This situation happens either when the capital earns the same retribution in 
both regions or when such factor is agglomerated in one of the two regions and this region pays 
the highest reward. One can visualise two types of long run equilibria; the interior ones which 
equalise profits between regions,
* ! ! = , or the core-periphery outcomes in which  0 = n s  and 
* ! ! < or  1 = n s  and 























1 * *  characterises the foreign level of freeness which is considered as an exogenous 
variable.  Equation (21) shows the positive relationship between the share of industries located in 
the  small  economy  and  the  spatial  distribution  of  expenditure  in  differentiated  goods.  Such 
relation reflects the fact that a high market size in one region tend to encourage concentration of 
firms in that economy. The process involves the interaction of two opposite forces. On the one 
hand,  monopolistic  firms  desire  to  locate  their  production  in  the  largest  market  in  order  to 
increase their sales and profits and export to small ones when trade barriers are present. Such 
behaviour is a distinctive characteristic of the monopolistic industry and defines the so-called 
market access effect, an agglomeration force. On the other hand, however, firms want to avoid 
competition locating their production in regions in which there are fewer competitors. This effect 
is called the market crowding effect and represents a dispersion force. Both forces make up the 
home market effect which highlights the outcome that for an exogenous change in the share of 



















s .  
The home market effect depends crucially on the levels of freeness of the home economy and the 
rest of the world. When protection diminishes and both economies become freer in terms of 
trade, the home market effect gets more powerful. The reduction in protection weakens the two 
forces, the market access advantage and the market crowding disadvantage. However, the fall in 
the tariff weakens the dispersion force in a higher speed than it weakens the agglomeration force. 
Hence, freer trade magnifies the degree of relocation of firms; capital becomes more footloose as  
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the  level  of  trade  freeness  increases.  Algebraically,  these  effects  can  be  reflected  by  the 






















HME  (22) 
The reasoning behind this argument is that as trade gets freer, competition from firms that are 
located in the other economy becomes as important as the competition that a firm faces from 
those firms that are located in the same region. The market crowding disadvantage of being in 
the larger market turns into an irrelevant problem. Hence, the incentive to relocate the capital 
factor from one region to the other in order to avoid competition vanishes; the competition is not 
very much localised at a low level of tariff barriers. The advantage of producing in the larger 
market, the market access effect, also erodes as the level of freeness increases since firms can 
have access to all markets when barriers are dismantled wherever they are installed.  
Since in the short run the level of protection in the small economy is determined in terms of the 
political and economic variables, one can define implicitly the home market effect in terms of 
such variables, that is: 
( ) ( ) n g s a f HME , , , ! " # =  (23) 
When the government has a valuable concern for the well-being of individuals, the share of 
voters who are members of the interest group, the mark-up and the constant elasticity are high, 
the home market effect becomes powerful since the level of freeness tends to be relatively high. 
An exogenous positive change in the market size will trigger a more than proportional change in 
the location of industry.   
An interesting issue arises when one considers the initial spatial distribution of industry. The 
home market effect may be affected by the initial share of firms since, as mentioned above, it 
affects the level of freeness. However, the direction of such impact is a priori not determined. If 
condition (5) holds, a high initial share will reinforce the home market effect. When the economy 
is too closed, the initial distribution of industry does not impact on the home market effect.    
Equation (21) shows that the location of industry depends not only on the market size but also on 
other  term.  The first  expression  in  the  RHS  of equation  (20)  is  also  related  to  the  level  of 
freeness. Hence, the total impact of the level of freeness on the spatial location is given by the 
following expression: 














#  (24)  
When trade costs are asymmetric, they affect the location of industry differently. In fact, a high 
level of protection in one economy creates a positive profit gap that favours such economy. The  
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difference in profits stimulates capital to flow from the region with a high level of freeness to the 
one with a high level of protection. While the level of freeness of the home economy affects the 
share of local industries negatively, the level of freeness of the foreign economy affects the 
industry share of the local region21 positively. 
A government that scarcely weights the welfare of individuals in the short run and set a high 
tariff will tend to induce a relocation of firms to its economy in the long run. Such relocation in 
favour of the relatively closed country is also probable when the owners of capital that are part of 
the lobby are few in number, the mark-up that  firms can charge is low and the demand of 
varieties is relatively inelastic. Moreover, the likelihood that such an economy may be the host of 
foreign firms, increases when the foreign country is a free trader.  
 
The market size 
Since  market  sizes  are  also  relevant  variables  that  define  the  economic  landscape  between 
regions, it is a useful task to fully characterise them.  Market shares are defined by the total 
income that local individuals spend on differentiated goods in each market in terms of the total 
world  spending  on  such  goods.  In  the  quasilinear  utility  function  (equation  1)  the  intensity 
parameter,µ ,  which  reveals  the  preferences  for  varieties,  is  assumed  to  be  common  to  all 
individuals in one region. However, though identical inside each region, it may differ across 
countries; 
* µ µ ! . Hence, the total spending of differentiated goods is simply µ I = !  in the home 
region and 
* * * µ I = !  in the foreign country and the  sum of both represents the total world 
spending  on  differentiated  goods, 





=   and  the 







1 22.  
As it was mention above, in every region each individual is endowed with one unit of labour and 
possibly  one  unit  of  capital;  accordingly  the  home  population  equals  the  number  of  labour 
factor, l I = .  The Labour force of the home economy can be expressed in terms of total world 
labour endowment, 
w
lL s I =  where 
* l l L




s = . The relative home market size is 
therefore: 
                                            














22 The quasilinear structure of preferences implies that income effects are absent; hence consumer spending on 
differentiated goods is independent of income.  









=  (25) 
Equation (25) expresses the relative market size of the home economy in terms of its endowment 
share of world labour and the ratio of the intensity measure of preferences for varieties. The 
more skewed local individuals’ preferences for differentiated goods in comparison with those of 




! , the bigger the relative market size. Also a higher share of the 
labour factor implies a higher market size.  
What does small economy mean? 
The terms “small economy”, “domestic economy” and “home economy” have been used to refer 
to the economy which is analysed without precisely defining in terms of which parameters the 
economy  might  be  considered  small.  The  term  small  economy  was  used  to  highlight  the 
existence of some kinds of asymmetries in the model beyond the one that exists in trade costs 
without explicitly specifying which asymmetries were taking place.  
Uneven regions may arise because of differences in market size and in factors endowments. The 
domestic economy can be small due to the fact that its relative market size is low, 2
1 < µ s . 
Equation (25) defines the market share in terms of the intensity ratio of preferences and the 
labour share of world labour endowment. Therefore, a low relative market size can be the result 
of a relative lower expenditure on differentiated goods by local individuals, a smaller population 
in  the  home  country,  or  both.  The  economy  also  might  be  small  in  terms  of  the  capital 
endowment, that is  2
1 < k s .  
When differences between regions are the outcome of differences in market share, a small size 
spurs firms to locate in the larger region; the market access advantage operates in favour of the 
rest of the world. However, the small economy has the advantage of being the region in which 
firms face less competition. A dispersed equilibrium is the likely result when trade costs are high 
since the small region protects pretty well its industry from the competition of the large region. 
As equation (24) shows, though a lower trade cost boosts the impact of  µ s  on n s , since 2
1 < µ s , 
such impact is not the one that predominates in the definition of the geographical distribution of 
firms. There is a process of delocation of firms from the small region to the large one as long as 
the tariff starts to fall. The political game can prevent such a delocation when the local lobby has 
the incentive and succeeds in the short run to persuade the government to set a high tariff, or 
when the incumbent scarcely cares about the general welfare or both.  
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If the economy is small in terms of its capital endowment, an interesting issue to analyse is 
whether the region is an importer or exporter of such factor. The difference between the share 
where the capital factor is employed, n s , and the spatial distribution of capital owners,  k s , gives 












## # µ u s s
 
holds, the small economy hosts the foreign capital.  Because of similar arguments expressed 
above, this situation is likely to occur when the local government implements a high tariff, when 
the foreign government follows a free trade policy and when the small economy is not too small 
in terms of the market size.  
 
Stability  
In the economic geography theory, a common practice to analyse the stability of equilibria is to 
differentiate the profits gap with respect to the share of firms and to evaluate the derivative at the 







# # ,  whatever  the 
equilibrium value of   n s . Baldwin et. al. have valuated the differential of the profit gap with 
respect to  n s  at the equilibrium expression (19). They show that the interior equilibrium is 
always stable. When one of the economies presents higher nominal profits, the fact that the 
capital factor will flow from the region that has lower profits to the one with higher nominal 
rewards, will tend to diminish the profit gap due to a fiercer competition. Migration of firms will 
stop when the positive gap of profits vanishes. The interior equilibrium is always stable.23  
 
 
5. An exercise 
 
The aim of this section is to present some intuitive comments about the theoretical model and its 
prediction  power  taking  into  account  the  political  parameters  that  have  been  estimated  in 
empirical papers. Though far from replicating the real state and presenting robust outcomes, 
some useful insights might arise from this exercise. 
                                            
23  The  absence  of  the  circular  causality  feature  prevents  the  model  to  present  unstable  outcomes  since 
agglomeration forces are not reinforced by capital migration.   
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Recently, several authors have found empirical support for the fundamental predictions of the 
Grossman  and  Helpman’s  model24.  Goldberg  and  Maggi  (1999)  and  Gawande  and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) have confirmed that the structure of trade protection in the United Stated 
in 1983 is consistent with the theoretical predictions of protection for sale. Mitra, Thomakos and 
Ulubaşoğlu (2002) have also found support of the model for Turkey both under dictatorial and 
democratic regimes. Calfat, Flôres and Gáname (2003) have studied whether countries that make 
up the Mercosur agreement would evidence endogenous protection in the formation of their tariff 
structure.  
Authors have also estimated the key structural parameters of the political economy model, the 
weight that governments attach to the general welfare and the fraction of the population that 
belongs to interest groups. In this section such parameters are used to perform a helpful exercise. 
Though these parameters are estimated assuming a different economic background, it would be 
interesting to see how endogenous protection would alter the economic landscape.  
Table 1 shows the outcomes for the United State (1983), Turkey (1983, 1988 and 1990) and 
Brazil  and  Uruguay  (1995).  Using  equation  (18),  the  level  of  freeness  is  endogenously 
determined for a particular value of the industry share which is given in the short run.25       
Particularly,  Goldberg  and  Maggi  (1999)  obtain  a  fairly  high  estimated  fraction  of  the  total 
individuals represented by a lobby for the US economy. Also the relative weight of welfare in 
the government objective is very high. Assuming that the US industry share is  20%, we can 
obtain the level of freeness. The last two columns present such measure for two different values 
of the elasticity parameter26. The level of freeness seems to be quite high. As the authors have 
argued, the Grossman and Helpman model is consistent with the data; however the magnitude of 
political considerations in the government’s objective is small. 
 
 
                                            
24 Though using different methodologies and different policy instruments of protection, all of the  above papers have 
obtained similar qualitative outcomes. They found that protection of the organized sector  is negatively related to 
import penetration while protection of the unorganized sector is positively related to import penetration. The modified 
Ramsey rule also finds support in some of these studies.  
25  These  shares  have  been  calculated using  as  a  proxy  variable  the  ratio  of  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  of  an 
individual country over the Total World Domestic Product. The data have been taken from the World Bank Indicators 
database.   
26 These values are the common ones used in some numerical simulations.   
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis: the short run equilibrium level of freeness 
 
Studies  Country  Parameters     Level of freeness  








  n s  
!  
σ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
!  
σ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Goldberg and Maggi (1999)  US 1983  0.883  0.986  1/5  0.705  0.591 
Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubaşoğlu (2002)  TURKEY 1983-1988-1990  0.65  0.987  1/200  ≅1.00  ≅1.00 
Calfat, Flôres and Gáname (2003)  BRAZIL    1995  0.67  0.99998  1/50  0.941  0.921 
   URUGUAY 1995  0.86  0.99951  1/2000  0.999  0.998 
 
Given the freeness measures, firms would tend to relocate inside the US economy if the rest of 
the world were the relatively more open economy as a whole. In this exercise,  1 =
US
n s  when 
* !   
takes  the  values  of  0.83  and  0.87.  By  contrary  the  US  economy  would  suffer  a  delocation 
process,  0 =
US
n s ,  when 
* !   equals  0.65  and  0.7927;  that  is  when  the  rest  of  the  world  is 
comparatively more closed.   
Calfat,  Flôres  and  Gáname  (2003)  retrieve  from  the  estimated  reduced  parameters  of  the 
common external tariff structure, the structural ones for Brazil and Uruguay28. Both parameters 
seem to be high for both countries. This fact gives as outcome a high value of freeness for both 
economies. Considering parameters of Brazil, one could expect a relocation process favouring 
this country only when the rest of the world would not use trade policies as a protective barrier, 
that is for a 1
* ! " .  
Finally, as table 1 shows, small economies, such  as Turkey and Uruguay present a level of 
freeness quite near to 1. With these levels, both economies would suffer a delocation process 
independently of the level of freeness of the rest of the world.  
 
                                            
27 The two values of 
* !  are related with the two values of !  calculated for the US economy. The thresholds 
* !  are 
calculated considering equation (20). The share spending is estimated considering the household final consumption 
expenditure of the 207 countries taken from the World Bank Indicators database.    
28 Only these two countries of Mercosur present completely significant results.   
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has aimed to explain the determinants of industry location and the  divergences that 
may arise among nations when incumbents select the trade policy endogenously. The model 
incorporates in an economic geography setting the political standpoint of why governments may 
select trade policies in a way that they are far from the ones that maximise the general well-
being. Particularly, two different backgrounds have been combined in order to characterise the 
political game and the economic structure. The G-H model has usefully served to characterise 
the political game due to the fact that it provides microfoundations for the payers’ behaviour. 
The FC model has provided the economic structure in which capital owners have the incentive to 
move their endowment between regions. This model gives the direction of industry location and 
the plausible explanations for relocation to occur. Since both models share the attractive feature 
of being relatively tractable, the author believes that their consideration  in building up a simple 
background, is a useful approach.  
As can be expected, predictions that are derived from the influence of political variables are the 
same as those of the G-H model. All things considered, a relevant government’s concern about 
the welfare of the general electorate will predict a high level of freeness. Though competition 
among lobbies is not present in this setting, as the share of voters who are members of the 
interest group increases, the level of trade freeness also increases. The deadweight loss that the 
lobby faces when a high tariff is implemented increases with g ! , but the extra profits that the 
group as a whole can derive do not change. When the negative impact in the welfare’s lobby 
becomes relatively more important than the positive effect of the extra benefit due to the positive 
change in the tariff, the lobby does not contribute. In fact, as truthful contributions reflect the 
marginal  change  in  the  lobby’s  welfare,  a  negative  impact  prevents  the  lobby  to  bid  for 
protection. 
Two  new  appealing  insights  come  from  the  consideration  of  the  monopolistic  competition 
structure. Firstly, in this setting the interest group seems to be more worried to persuade the 
government to set a high tariff when it can charge a low mark up. This insight is in line with the 
argument  presented  by  Baldwin  and  Nicoud  (2002)  in  entry  and  asymmetry  lobbying:  why 
governments pick losers. In fact, authors combine a standard monopolistic competition model 
with the G-H model, differently from how it is done here, to answer the paradox of why losers 
obtain  more  protection  via  a  factor  subsidy.  They  explain  the  asymmetric  incentive  of  why 
interest groups fight harder to avoid losses than they do to win new gains due to an asymmetric 
appropriability.  Secondly, the initial distribution of industry might also influence the structure of  
 
26 
26 • IDPM-UA Working Paper 2005-01 
protection in one economy. On the one hand, the presence of a high number of firms in such 
economy involves a tight level of competition among firms that tends to erode the potential gains 
that capital owners would derive from the protectionist policy. In this situation, lobbying activity 
might become less fruitfully. On the other hand, if the number of firms might reflect a measure 
of the lobby’s political power, a higher number will magnify the potential gains from protection. 
Hence, the lobby would be more disposed to bid for protection. When an economy is too closed, 
the industry share is not a relevant variable in the determination of the trade policy.   
The  trade  policy  endogenously  determined  becomes  the  channel  to  understand  how  the 
behaviours of a single lobby and an opportunistic government impact on the long run spatial 
distribution of industry. When the rest of the world is a free trader and the spending share of that 
economy is relatively small, the marginal change in trade policy has a relevant impact on the 
industry share. Amazingly, if a small economy is characterised by a government that is not very 
much concerned about general welfare and there is a vigorous lobby of few capital owners that 
play actively, the possible outcome will be a relocation of industry that favours such economy. 
Capital owners might make capital flow to look for protection.  
The consideration of political variables may bring into scene a dispersion force that influences 
the definition of the economic landscape picture. This insight is also present in several studies in 
which a political economy background and an economic geography model are interrelated. In 
fact, Baldwin et al.29 (2003), considering the voting model and the FC model to analyse the 
effect of an endogenous location subsidy, emphasize that the equilibrium industry share of one 
region  is  increasing  with  the  market  size  (the  home  market  effect)  but  decreasing  with  the 
ideological  heterogeneity  of  that  economy  (what  Robert-Nicoud  and  Sbergami  call  the  vote 
market effect).  
Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) generalise the effect of the political determinants on the spatial 
distribution of firms.  In a FE linear model, the authors introduce the political game to see which 
group, the skilled and/or unskilled workers, will have the incentive to form an interest group. 
Authors analyse how lobbies will influence a political choice between free mobility and mobility 
barriers. The political game in this case might lead to an agglomerated or dispersed equilibrium 
depending on the surpluses that players derive from both alternatives and on the level of trade 
costs. In this model, a second best optimum can be achieved due to the political game.   
Finally,  the  last  remarks  are  going  to  be  the  guide  for  potential  future  improvements  and 
extensions of this paper. Firstly, it would be interesting to consider other region to characterise 
                                            
29 Chapter 18 “The political Economics of regional subsidies” based on Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2001).  
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not only the impacts of the unilateral change in the endogenous tariff but also to analyse the 
effects of trade integration processes on the spatial distribution of firms. Secondly, though for the 
sake of simplicity the author considers the political game only in one country, political variables 
should also be modelled in the foreign country. Grossman and Helpman (1995 a, b) take into 
account the international political dependency shaping two levels of strategic interaction; one in 
which governments set trade policies facing international restrictions, the other in which the 
incumbent deals with its internal political system. Thirdly, the model should be extended to 
analyse not only the effects of an ad valorem tariff but also the other sorts of trade policy, 
particularly the ones that are non-tariff barriers. This extension should take into account the 
important remark set by Behrens et al. (2003). The authors clearly advise that the way trade and 
transports  costs  are  modelled  is  not  neutral  for  the  nature  of  the  results  in  an  economic 
geography setting. In fact, depending on whether they are modeled as iceberg costs (ad-valorem 
tariff)  or  linear  costs  (non  tariff  barriers), their impacts  on  the  economic  landscape  may  be 
different. Hence, the authors stress the need for more realistic specifications in which both kinds 
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